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It is difficult to think of a recent book by a social sci-
entist, and impossible to think of one by an economist,
that is of as much potential interest to historians as Tho-
mas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Its
central question is an inherently historical one about
the relationship between capital accumulation and in-
equality in the very long run. And the theory that
Piketty proposes by way of an answer—that rising in-
equality is inherent to the dynamics of capitalism—de-
pends for its persuasiveness on the historical analysis he
draws on to substantiate it. The book also deserves his-
torians’ attention for Piketty’s admonishment of econ-
omists for “their absurd claim to greater scientific le-
gitimacy, despite the fact that they know almost nothing
about anything” (p. 32), and his enthusiasm for the
study of history as an antidote. Indeed, in Piketty’s
mind, his book is “as much a work of history as of eco-
nomics” (p. 33).
Certainly historians will learn a great deal from the
impressive research program that Thomas Piketty, Em-
manuel Saez, Anthony Atkinson, and others have un-
dertaken on the history of inequality. Yet if Piketty had
wanted to write a book that was just about inequality,
he would not have called it “Capital.” He has bigger fish
to fry—no less than the relationship between economic
growth, capital accumulation, and inequality—but the
book disappoints when it comes to linking its larger
claims to historical analysis.
The crucial question that Piketty addresses is
whether, in the process of economic development, the
convergence or divergence of incomes and wealth dom-
inates. Piketty argues that the “lessons of history” re-
veal capitalism’s structural tendency to generate higher
levels of inequality over time, belying the claims of op-
timists embodied in the so-called Kuznets curve, that
inequality increases during the early stage of economic
growth but declines later on. Instead, what Piketty de-
scribes as “the fundamental force for divergence” kicks
in when the economy grows slowly—when the growth
rate (g) is lower than the return on capital (r)—which
he claims is the rule in capitalism. That means that over
time the capital stock takes on “disproportionate im-
portance” relative to economic output and returns to
capitalists increase relative to returns to labor.
Most of Capital in the Twenty-First Century is taken up
with an analysis of historical trends to support the
book’s controversial claim that capitalism breeds in-
equality. Piketty begins with economic growth, claiming
that, despite “the spectacular increase in standards of
living since the Industrial Revolution” (p. 87), growth
rates will decline in the future. He contends that pop-
ulation growth “explains” half of the economic growth
that has occurred in the world since the beginning of the
nineteenth century, and suggests the implausibility of
equally high rates of population growth in the future.
Yet his analysis elides the complexity of the historical
relationship between population and economic growth;
as Piketty’s nemesis, Simon Kuznets, pointed out many
years ago, the historical association between population
growth and economic growth is loose over time and
across countries and, even when it exists, does not nec-
essarily imply causation (Kuznets, “Population and
Economic Growth,” Proceedings of the American Phil-
osophical Society 111, no. 3 [1967]: 170–193). It is for
this reason that historians tend to look to growth in out-
put per head, rather than the number of heads, for ex-
planations of economic growth.
When Piketty turns to productivity growth, he is also
confident that it will be lower in the future than the past
but, in historical terms, he is on still thinner ice. He
never actually offers any explanation of “the spectac-
ular increase in per capita output” (p. 93) in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, so it is unclear what ba-
sis he has for concluding that the forces that drove
economic growth in the past will no longer operate in
the future. Strikingly, when Piketty alludes to the dy-
namics that foster economic growth—technology, in-
novation, knowledge diffusion—there is one word that
he never uses: capital.
There have been serious debates in economic history
about the importance of capital formation in the pro-
cess of economic development, with the Industrial Rev-
olution being an especially striking case in point. Yet
Piketty omits any historical analysis of the productive
role of capital—capital to buy machines or to hold in-
ventories—capital, that is, in the most prosaic sense of
the term. The omission puts him on an entirely different
wavelength than historians who study the role of capital
in the economies of the past, and surely explains why he
relies so little on their work.
The modest attention that Piketty pays to the role
that capital plays in the process of economic develop-
ment stems from his definition of capital as “the sum
total of nonhuman assets that can be owned and ex-
changed on some market” (p. 46). Thus, capital can in-
clude machines and inventories but it can also include
residential property and financial assets. Indeed, Piket-
ty’s capital is so encompassing as to be amorphous,
which explains why in part II, on the historical dynamics
of capital, we experience a growing sense of abstraction.
As a historian of capital, Piketty is a “lumper” not a
“splitter” with his sights set on measuring the historical
relationship between aggregate capital and national in-
come. Prior to World War I, what Piketty emphasizes
is the overall stability of the capital-income ratio. Then
history changes radically with the shocks of World War
I and the Depression and we witness a collapse in the
capital-income ratio in Europe—where “[b]y the mid-
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dle of the twentieth century, capital had largely disap-
peared” (p. 118)—and in the U.S. Then, in the after-
math of World War II, we observe a resurgence of the
capital-income ratio to levels that were close to those
recorded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies.
For explaining these “metamorphoses of capital,”
Piketty highlights the importance of both contingency
and structure. It is contingency—the “shocks to capital”
from war and depression—that accounts for the “diz-
zying fall” in the capital-income ratio in the interwar
period in Europe. And it is structure, expressed in a
simple accounting identity that links the capital-income
ratio to growth and savings,   s/g, that explains nor-
malcy (p. 183). But Piketty provides little help in ac-
counting for how shocks to capital feed into a decline
in his capital-income ratios. His text is confined to gen-
eral statements that apply to all of interwar Europe and
do little to illuminate some of the startling declines his
data suggest (p. 116). The reader is left to guess what
is going on in the big swirling bucket of “other domestic
capital” that lumps together blast furnaces, jewelry,
bank accounts, and schools.
When Piketty moves from contingency to structure,
from chaos to normalcy, it initially seems easier to fol-
low changes in the capital-income ratio. He claims that
“capital’s comeback” since the 1970s can be explained
by “slower growth coupled with continued high savings”
consistent with the simple formula above. However, we
soon realize that   s/g is not a straightforward ac-
counting identity since Piketty’s capital-income ratio is
influenced by the valuations assigned to capital. And so,
since the 1970s, the rising market valuations of corpo-
rate stocks and housing contribute to the rising capital-
income ratios that Piketty’s graphs show (pp. 187–191).
Piketty recognizes that estimating all forms of capital
at market prices at a given point in time “introduces an
element of arbitrariness (markets are often capri-
cious)” but, he asks, “how else could one possibly add
up hectares of farmland, square meters of real estate,
and blast furnaces?” (p. 149). Yet, by lumping so much
together, and measuring it at market value, he obscures
as much as he reveals about the dynamics of capital. In
particular, it is hard to know what variations in Piketty’s
capital-income ratio imply for the economy’s capacity
to produce goods and services. In principle, an increase
in the capital-income ratio could be a positive sign, an
indication that the economy is moving to a more pro-
ductive phase, characterized by higher capital intensity.
Piketty recognizes this possibility when he says that
“capital is potentially useful to everyone, and provided
that things are properly organized, everyone can benefit
from it” (p. 167) but he provides no help in determining
when “things” might be “properly organized.” We are
left with a substantial ambiguity: an increase in Piketty’s
capital-income ratio might result from more assets be-
ing put to work to produce greater output or from
higher valuations being assigned to existing assets.
Unfortunately, which scenario we are in makes a ma-
jor difference to how we perceive the rate of return paid
to capitalists. Is it the cost to society of moving to a
higher level of economic development, as apologists of
capital claim, or a measure of rentiers’ gains on every-
one else’s backs, as critics of capitalism contend?
Piketty cannot seem to make up his mind which sce-
nario he believes more plausible—he pulls back from
the brink of heterodoxy several times to emphasize the
risk-bearing and entrepreneurial role of capital—but,
in the end, it is the lack of clarity in his analysis, rather
than his ideology, that weighs on his book on capital.
Talk of the rewards to capital brings me to the final
step in Piketty’s analysis, where he moves from capital
to inequality. He does so based on an analysis of the
rate of return on capital, r, which, when multiplied by
the capital-income ratio, gives us , the share of na-
tional income that goes to capital. Thus we have the
final link in his logical chain—  r x —which links
growth to development to inequality. Consistent with
his broad definition of capital, the rate of return
thereon is equally encompassing (p. 54), and he esti-
mates it over a long period of time based on French and
British data.
On the face of it, the main conclusion he draws from
this exercise is a striking one: the “pure return on cap-
ital” is extremely stable over time, oscillating “around
a central value of 4–5 percent a year for more than two
centuries” (p. 202). However, when one remembers
that he is using market valuations of capital, the result
is less surprising. If Jane Austen and Honore´ de Balzac
were right that the capital value of an asset bears some
consistent relationship to the income it generates (p.
53), then the income that an asset generates should
bear some consistent relationship to its capital value
(Irving Fisher, The Rate of Interest: Its Nature, Deter-
mination and Relation to Economic Phenomena [1907],
p. 13).
If, in Piketty’s Capital, the value of capital and the
return on capital are two sides of the same coin, the
need for a theory of the rate of return on capital is not
clear. Nevertheless, having characterized historical
trends in the return on capital, Piketty seeks to explain
them. It is at this late stage that the question of “What
is capital used for?” becomes central, since Piketty con-
siders it crucial for determining the rate of return on
capital. Yet here he confronts the handicap of having
written a book in which the main references to “factory”
are to Pe`re Goriot’s pasta making, quite an accomplish-
ment for a book that takes us from pre-industrial to
post-industrial economies! Having said so little about
the productive role of capital, Piketty flails about, now
that he needs it, asking us to imagine all kinds of dif-
ferent societies, in the abstract, in which capital could
or would be used in one way or another as a factor of
production to earn a return (pp. 212–215). Yet, what
about the returns in actual economies in which capital
has been used, perhaps in the past?
Since Piketty’s discussion of the determinants of the
rate of return on capital is so inconclusive, we do not
know if we should be concerned if returns to capital are
falling or rising. As he shows, the significant diminution
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of income inequality over the twentieth century largely
reflects a decrease in top incomes from capital. He
claims there was nothing natural about the decline; it
was caused above all else by political change and, spe-
cifically, by “new public policies enacted in this period
(from rent control to nationalizations and the inflation-
induced euthanasia of the rentier class that lived on
government debt)” (p. 275). So much for the causes of
the decline in the return to capital, but when it comes
to its economic implications Piketty’s analysis leaves us
in the dark.
And what of the recent resurgence of income in-
equality? If this book has sold like hot cakes, it is be-
cause so many people, especially Americans, want to
understand why inequality has increased lately. How-
ever, in a surprising and ironic denouement worthy of
the great novels that Piketty is fond of citing, we learn
that a rising share of income going to capital is not the
primary explanation of growing income inequality in
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In-
stead, he suggests we look to the massive growth in the
inequality of labor income in Anglophone countries
driven by an explosion of rewards to executives of their
largest firms. Perhaps most surprisingly of all, Piketty
portrays the rise of the “supermanager” as having little
to do with the dynamics of capital. One wonders, how-
ever, about a theory of capital that cannot explain how
senior corporate executives have used their control of
America’s so-called capitalist corporations to system-
atically enrich themselves. Perhaps it is missing a fun-
damental law or two.
What then should we make of Piketty’s study? It is a
stimulating book: Piketty deals with big questions, he
has thought deeply about them, and writes about them
in an engaging way. He is articulate about the limita-
tions of data and the way they are constructed. When
it comes to historical phenomena, there is no question
that what he says about inequality is of much interest
to historians. If I have been critical of Piketty’s book,
it is because I have read it as a book about capital, which
is what the author intended it to be. And, from that
perspective, the book seems to abstract from, rather
than resolve, important questions for the history of cap-
italism.
Piketty believes that to address fundamental ques-
tions about capitalism, one needs to be a historian as
well as an economist. What he does not acknowledge is
that some of what he has learned as an economist is an
obstacle to learning from history and nowhere is con-
ventional economics weaker than when it comes to cap-
ital. Irving Fisher tried to cover up this weakness with
fables of orchards and the fruits of a bounteous nature
for explaining the productivity of capital. Still, he never
overcame it and neither does Piketty. No matter how
much data you marshal, they are only interesting if you
make sense of them, and the lumbering, amorphous
concept of capital that pervades Piketty’s book is just
not up to the task. And so, notwithstanding this book,
capital remains the blind spot of capitalism. So it will
remain until economists prove willing not only to do the
laborious work of creating vast historical datasets, but
also to reconsider the suitability of their existing eco-
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